At moments of political tension, uncertainty, or transition, leaders often turn to political agreements as quick solutions. Power-sharing deals, coalition arrangements, elite pacts, and peace accords are announced with great fanfare and framed as breakthroughs. Yet, time and again, such agreements fail to deliver lasting stability or public confidence. The reason is not far-fetched: no political agreement can override the social contract between the state and its citizens.
The social contract is the moral and political foundation of any legitimate state. Long before constitutions and elections, thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that political authority exists only because individuals consent, explicitly or implicitly, to be governed. This consent is exchanged for protection, justice, and the promotion of collective welfare. Where this bargain collapses, the authority of the state itself is called into question.
Political agreements are of a different order. They are negotiated arrangements among political actors, usually elites, designed to manage power at a particular moment. They may determine who governs, who shares offices, or how resources are distributed among factions. Such agreements can be useful, especially in post-conflict or deeply divided societies. But they are instruments, not foundations.
The danger arises when political agreements begin to act as substitutes for the social contract. When leaders treat elite consensus as more important than popular consent, governance loses its moral anchor. Citizens may obey temporarily, but obedience without legitimacy is fragile.
The social contract is supreme because it defines the purpose of the state. It establishes that government exists not for rulers, parties, or coalitions, but for the people. Political agreements, by contrast, often prioritise elite survival. They focus on stability at the top while ignoring the everyday realities of insecurity, unemployment, inequality, and injustice experienced by ordinary citizens.
This tension explains why many political agreements provoke public backlash. People are not opposed to compromise or peace. They are opposed to exclusion. When decisions affecting millions are taken behind closed doors by a few, citizens feel alienated from the political process. Over time, this alienation manifests as voter apathy, protest movements, or outright rejection of state authority.
History provides many examples. Peace agreements that silence guns but fail to address social injustice often collapse. Coalition governments that share power but neglect public welfare rarely endure. Elite bargains that protect political actors from accountability weaken trust in institutions. In each case, the underlying problem is the same: the agreement violated the spirit of the social contract.
Modern constitutions are meant to institutionalise the social contract. They limit power, guarantee rights, and affirm that sovereignty belongs to the people. Any political agreement that undermines constitutional principles, by entrenching exclusion, suspending accountability, or weakening equality before the law, erodes the social contract itself. Even when such agreements are legal, they may still be illegitimate in the eyes of citizens.
This issue is particularly acute in post-colonial societies. Many states were born not from popular consent but from colonial arrangements and elite negotiations. After independence, political agreements often replaced genuine social contracts. Power was shared among elites, while citizens remained distant from the state. The result has been persistent legitimacy crises, weak institutions, and cycles of instability.
In these contexts, political agreements are frequently celebrated as signs of maturity or pragmatism. Yet without a parallel effort to renew the social contract, through inclusion, justice, and accountability, such agreements merely postpone deeper crises. Stability achieved at the expense of legitimacy is temporary.
The supremacy of the social contract also has implications for democracy. Elections alone do not constitute a social contract. When elections merely rotate elites without improving citizens’ lives, democratic legitimacy suffers. The social contract demands more: responsive governance, protection of rights, and meaningful participation. Political agreements that undermine these principles, even if they follow electoral outcomes, weaken democracy rather than strengthen it.
Importantly, affirming the supremacy of the social contract does not mean rejecting all political agreements. Compromise is a necessary part of politics. However, political agreements must derive their authority from the social contract. They must reflect popular interests, uphold constitutional values, and strengthen citizen-state relations. When agreements serve the public good, they reinforce legitimacy. When they serve narrow interests, they undermine it.
Ultimately, governments do not survive on signatures, handshakes, or press conferences. They survive on trust. Trust grows when citizens believe that the state exists for them, not for a privileged few. That belief is the essence of the social contract.
Political agreements may organise power, but they cannot justify it. Only the social contract can do that. Any society that forgets this risks mistaking elite stability for genuine peace, and temporary order for lasting legitimacy.
By: Christian U. Abu, PhD, MNIM, MAAPS*
Political Scientist
Rivers State, Porthacourt
Nigeria.
